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Abstract—Electronic Health Record (EHR) systems are being
introduced to overcome the limitations associated with paper-
based and isolated Electronic Medical Record (EMR) systems.
This is accomplished by aggregating medical data and consoli-
dating them in one digital repository. Though an EHR system
provides obvious functional benefits, there is a growing concern
about the privacy and reliability (trustworthiness) of Electronic
Health Records. Security requirements such as confidentiality,
integrity, and availability can be satisfied by traditional hard
security mechanisms. However, measuring data trustworthiness
from the perspective of data entry is an issue that cannot be
solved with traditional mechanisms, especially since degrees of
trust change over time. In this paper, we introduce a Time-
variant Medical Data Trustworthiness (TMDT) assessment model
to evaluate the trustworthiness of medical data by evaluating the
trustworthiness of its sources, namely the healthcare organisation
where the data was created and the medical practitioner who
diagnosed the patient and authorised entry of this data into the
patient’s medical record, with respect to a certain period of time.
The result can then be used by the EHR system to manipulate
health record metadata to alert medical practitioners relying on
the information to possible reliability problems.
I. INTRODUCTION
The healthcare domain—as one of the world’s largest hybrid
organisations—stands to gain enormously from the increased
adoption of Information and Communications Technologies.
Electronic Health Record (EHR) systems are the latest evolu-
tion of healthcare ICT.
Electronic Health Records can enable efficient communi-
cation of medical information, and thus reduce costs and
administrative overheads [1], [4]. However, to achieve these
potential benefits, the healthcare industry needs to overcome
several significant obstacles, in particular concerns about the
trustworthiness (reliability) of EHR medical data. Trustworthi-
ness is a crucial factor that has a strong effect on how medical
practitioners use data [5]. This concern is raised because
EHR data is composed from different healthcare providers’
Electronic Medical Record (EMR) systems, from paper-based
medical reports and from referrals that patients get from those
healthcare providers who do not have an EMR system or
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an electronic connection with the EHR system. By using an
EHR system, a medical practitioner will thus be exposed
to historical medical data with varying levels of reliability;
the data might originate from a healthcare organisation that
does not satisfy patient safety requirements, e.g. is known
to habitually enter inaccurate or incomplete data, or be en-
tered by a medical practitioner who fails to satisfy medical
guidelines, e.g. is known to violate medical procedures. As a
consequence, the trustworthiness of EHR data depends on the
trustworthiness of its source and creator. In order to measure
the trustworthiness of an agent, reputation systems [13], [14]
provide an accumulative trustworthiness measure of an agent
where all past experiences and/or feedback about the agent
are combined. Most reputation systems are built to assess the
trustworthiness of an agent at the present time. In other words
they provide the expected future behaviour of an agent based
on its current trustworthiness. However, they do not provide
a way to assess an agent’s trustworthiness at a particular
time in the past. Evaluating the trustworthiness of past entries
is crucial in the healthcare domain where a medical history
combines historical medical data.
To illustrate this requirement, consider the following ex-
ample. Assume that in year 2009 Hospital A’s EHR system
received two medical reports, Patient Y’s diagnosis and Patient
Z’s prescription, that were created by Dr X in 2000 and 2005
respectively. The EHR system maintains a database where it
stores its observed experiences with external agents. It uses an
TABLE I
THE EHR’S OBSERVED TRUSTWORTHINESS OF DR X
Time Number of observed experiences TrustworthinessGood Bad
1999 1 1 0.5
2000 2 0 0.75
2001 3 0 0.85
2002 1 6 0.5
2003 0 7 0.33
2004 0 7 0.25
2005 0 5 0.21
2006 1 0 0.23
2007 6 0 0.35
2008 5 0 0.42
2009 6 1 0.48
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Fig. 1. The EHR’s continuous trustworthiness measurement of Dr Tony
eBay-like reputation system (though this is not an appropriate
mechanism as we will see in Section II) in which it records
the number of observed good and bad experiences with an
agent per annum and uses this to calculate a cumulative
trust measure (Table I). In this case, these good and bad
experiences are generated from previously evaluated medical
entries that were created by Dr X. Correct diagnoses and
accurately following medical procedures are examples of good
experiences whereas misdiagnoses, incomplete or careless data
entry, and failure to follow medical procedures are bad events.
Fig. 1 represents the observed trustworthiness of Dr X that
Hospital A maintains over time.
Now, let’s see how Hospital A will evaluate the trust-
worthiness of the received two medical reports. In current
reputation systems, the calculated trustworthiness value of
Dr X in the year 2009 will be used as the trustworthiness of
the two medical records, however this is an inaccurate measure
because it represents Dr X’s expected future behaviour instead
of his previous behaviour at the time the records were created.
From Fig. 1, we notice that Patient Y’s diagnosis was created
at a time period when Dr X was evaluated to be trustworthy,
whereas Patient Z’s prescription was written during a time
period when Dr X was believed to be untrustworthy. Therefore,
assigning the trustworthiness value that is calculated in year
2009 to these two medical records is inappropriate due to
the fact that trustworthiness is a dynamic attribute and varies
according to Dr X’s behaviour as shown in Fig. 1.
Another approach is to consider Dr X’s absolute trust-
worthiness value in 2000 and 2005 for these two records.
Although this approach provides a better estimate, it does
not consider the dynamic behaviour of the trustworthiness
attribute. For example, between 1999 and 2001, inclusive,
Dr X was believed to be providing trustworthy medical data.
However in 2002 he has been shown not to follow appropriate
medical procedures in his diagnosis of a particular case, and
this error has been detected more than once. Therefore, this
change of Dr X’s trustworthiness will have an impact on his
immediately preceding data entries, and the same thing can be
said about the impact of his previous trustworthiness behaviour
on the following medical data entries.
In this paper, we introduce a Time-Variant Medical Data
Trustworthiness assessment (TMDT) model to assist the EHR
system to validate the trustworthiness of received/stored med-
ical data. The TMDT model uses a statistical approach that
depends on the observed experiences available to the EHR
system and its context assumptions. In order to provide an
accurate trustworthiness estimate for historical medical data,
we consider a time period that defines the trustworthiness
assessment’s time scope around the time when the data was
produced. The defined time scope enables our model to capture
the dynamic behaviour of the agent’s trustworthiness. To
conduct this assessment we use medical metadata to extract
information about the medical data sources (e.g. timestamps,
healthcare agents, and medical practitioners) and, thereafter,
this information is used in a statistical process to derive the
trustworthiness value of the medical data. The result can then
be expressed in the health record by manipulating the EHR’s
metadata to alert the medical practitioner to possible reliability
problems.
II. RELATED WORK
Reputation systems provide a useful approach to assess the
trustworthiness (or reliability) of a certain agent or service.
These systems provide a reputation score for an agent cal-
culated from the agent’s ratings as voted on by others who
have experienced a transaction with the agent. For instance,
eBay’s1 feedback forum is one of the earliest online reputation
systems; it collects buyers’ feedback (either +1, 0, or −1) and
aggregates them equally [10] to produce a global reputation
score for the seller. The global score is further processed to
provide the percentage of positive feedback gained by the
seller. However, this additive scheme ignores the personalised
nature of reputation measures [9]. It merely produces a sum
of all historical behaviour and does not provide a view of
behaviour at particular times in the past. A slightly better
approach, the average reputation scheme [11], provides an
improved calculation because it computes the reputation score
as the average of all ratings. This principle is used in the
reputation systems of many commercial web sites, such as
Revolution Health2 and Amazon3. Although the averaging
reputation scheme is better than the additive scheme, it still
has the same weaknesses.
In Peer-to-Peer (P2P) research, many reputation models
have been proposed to assist in assigning reputation scores
to those agents within the P2P network. These scores help
an agent (service seeker) to make its own decision to trust
and connect to the most honest and reliable agents (service
providers). EigenTrust [8] is a reputation-based trust manage-
ment system that aims to minimise malicious behaviour in
a peer-to-peer network. It computes the agents’ trust scores
through repeated and iterative multiplication and aggregation
of trust scores along transitive chains until the trust scores
for all agent members of the P2P community converge to
stable values. PeerTrust [13], [14] is another reputation-based
trust management system for P2P eCommerce communities.
It is even more cautious and examines the received ratings for
their quality. It uses five factors to do so, namely feedback in
terms of the amount of satisfaction, the number of transactions,
the transaction’s context factor, and the community context
factor. These factors are used to discount the agent’s trust
value. However, our work differs from these two models in
two respects. Firstly, in the healthcare context, it’s crucial to
have on hand the identity of the agent who created the medical
data (i.e. the healthcare provider or medical practitioner) in
order to ensure accountability. In this way, the healthcare
context differs significantly from the P2P context. Secondly,
in our model we follow a sounder time-variant and context-
dependant mathematical basis that uses beta and dirichlet
probability density functions for combining feedback and for
expressing reputation scores, which makes our model capable
of evaluating the trustworthiness of historical data that the
former two models fail to achieve.
Beta and dirichlet probability density functions are used
widely in the reputation arena [3], [6], [7], [12] to compute
reputation scores in order to predict the expected future
behaviour of an agent. However, they have not been employed
to evaluate an agent’s expected behaviour at particular times
in the past. Therefore, our model extends these approaches to
1www.ebay.com
2www.revolutionhealth.com
3www.amazon.com
enable the evaluation of an agent’s reputation at a certain time
in the past by considering a time period centered around the
time at which an event occured.
III. TIME-VARIANT MEDICAL DATA TRUSTWORTHINESS
(TMDT) ASSESSMENT MODEL
Let’s assume a healthcare agent ha has received (or has)
medical data md about a specific patient p, and that md
consists of medical data fields mdfs and each mdf ∈ mdfs has
attached metadata meta. This metadata provides information
about the source healthcare organisation src where mdf
was created, and it reveals the identity mp of the medical
practitioner who diagnosed patient p and authorised entry of
data mdf into p’s medical record. In addition, the metadata
records the timestamp t of the lodged mdf .
In order for agent ha to evaluate the trustworthiness T tha,mdf
of a given medical data field mdf at time t, it conducts
a trustworthiness assessment for those agents who produced
the mdf data. It evaluates the trustworthiness of the source
healthcare organisation src and the medical practitioner mp
at time t, denoted AT tha,ag , where ag ∈ {src,mp}. Also, it
employs the legal agent ag’s medical misconduct practice rate
MRag which affects our trust in medical data field mdf if it
appears that ag has had any medical malpractice cases. Finally,
healthcare agent ha substitutes this information in Eq. 1 to
produce a trustworthiness measure for medical data field mdf
which produces values between 0 (not-trusted) and 1 (fully-
trusted).
T tha,mdf =
∑
ag∈AG
ξagAT
t
ha,ag ×
∑
ag∈AG
ωagMRag
where

AG = {src,mp}∑
ag∈AG ωag = 1∑
ag∈AG ξag = 1
(1)
Here ξsrc and ξmp are weighting factors that are set by the
healthcare agent ha to express the importance that ha puts on
the trustworthiness of the roles of the source healthcare agent
and medical practitioner. Also, ωsrc and ωmp are weighting
factors that denote the significance that ha puts on received
medical misconduct rates for these two agents.
In the following sections, we show the calculation process
for the terms in Eq. 1.
A. Trustworthiness Evaluation
In the TMDT model, we follow two approaches in calculat-
ing the trustworthiness of a given agent ag ∈ AG at time t, and
this approach is determined by evaluating confidence criteria.
In this model, we define the confidence criteria as the number
of interaction experiences n with agent ag during period T .
The time scope T is determined by using a fixed offset per
to be the interval [t − per, t + per] in order to capture the
dynamic behaviour of the agent’s trustworthiness. Offset per
is set by the EHR system’s administrator and can be changed
at any time. The size of per influences our assessment’s final
result as we show in Section IV.
However, based on the criteria, healthcare agent ha will use
its own internal assessment approach if its direct interaction
experiences with agent ag within period T is greater than
or equal to n, otherwise it will use an external assessment
where it will seek assistance from neighboring agents and use
information generated from reputation systems (Figure 2).
1) Internal Assessment: Healthcare agent ha uses its
database that records good and bad historical experiences
with agents including healthcare organisations and medical
practitioners. These experiences are represented in a binary
format, Eha,ag , where Eha,ag = 1 implies that ha has a
good experience with ag and Eha,ag = 0 indicates a bad
experience. During a specific time scope T , the history of
experiences between agents ha and ag is recorded as a tuple,
ETha,ag =
(
#{t ∈ T |Etha,ag = 1},#{t ∈ T |Etha,ag = 0}
)
.
The probability p(Etha,ag) that an agent ag has provided
correct or trustworthy data at time t is governed by its
behaviour function BTha,ag during period T .
p(Etha,ag = 1)
def= BTha,ag, where
BTha,ag ∈ [0, 1] and T = [t− per, t+ per]
From this point on, we use B to denote ag’s perceived trust
in data received by ha at time t.
In order to compute the trustworthiness of a given agent ag,
we adopt a probabilistic approach to modeling trust, based on
the recorded experiences with ag. If a healthcare agent ha
has complete information about agent ag then, according to
ha, the probability that ag has provided correct/trustworthy
information is expressed by B. In general, however, complete
information cannot be assumed, and according to the Bayesian
view [2], the best we can do is to use the expected value
of B given ha’s knowledge. In particular, we consider ha’s
knowledge of agent ag to be the set of all experiences it
has observed. However, in adopting a Bayesian rather than
frequentist stance (e.g. as does eBay), we allow for the prob-
ability that ha may use other information in its assessment.
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Fig. 2. Getting information from external sources
Therefore, we define ag’s trustworthiness at time t according
to ha as the expected behaviour of ag at time t given the
set of ag’s experiences that were recorded in the surrounding
period T . This is expressed using standard statistical notation
as shown in Eq. 2.
AT tha,ag
def= E[B|ETha,ag] (2)
In order to determine this expected value, we need a prob-
ability distribution, defined by a probability density function
(pdf), which is used to model the relative probability that B
will have a certain value. In Bayesian analysis, the beta family
of pdfs is commonly used as a prior distribution for a random
variable that takes on continuous values in the interval [0, 1].
For example, beta pdfs can be used to model the distribution
of a random variable representing the unknown probability of
a binary event, where B is an example of such a variable.
Therefore, beta pdfs have been applied in previous work in
modeling trust [6].
The standard formula for beta distribution is expressed in
Eq. 3, in which two parameters, α and β define the shape of
the density function.
f(Bha,ag|α, β) def= (Bha,ag)
α(1−Bha,ag)β−1∫ 1
0
Uα−1(1− U)β−1dU
,
where α, β > 0
(3)
In order to calculate the expected value of B, we need to
define values for α and β that represent ha’s belief about ag.
With zero experiences with ag, ha believes that all possible
values of B are equally likely, thus ha’s initial values for
α and β are α = β = 1. These parameters are updated
according to ha’s observation about ag, where the value of
α gets incremented by the number of good experiences gTha,ag
that are recorded in time period T , and β gets increased by
the number of bad experiences bTha,ag as in Eq. 4.
α = gTha,ag + 1 and β = b
T
ha,ag + 1 (4)
Then, ag’s trustworthiness according to ha is calculated as
the expected value of beta distribution.
AT tha,ag
def= E[B|ETha,ag] =
α
α+ β
(5)
2) External Assessment: In this approach, healthcare agent
ha seeks information about agent ag from external sources
(Figure 2). In our model, we assume that this information
can be retrieved from neighboring healthcare agents, NH =
{ha1, ha2, . . . , han}, and from healthcare reputation centres,
HR = {rp1, rp2, . . . , rpm}; these sources are assumed to be
known to ha and are communicated in a secure manner. In this
case, we use ha’s neighboring healthcare agents’ experiences
or trustworthiness estimates in addition to ha’s internal esti-
mates to calculate the propagated trustworthiness PT tha,NH,ag
in ag. In addition, we use agent ag’s estimated reputation rates
RP tha,HR,ag that are derived from the patients’ feedback about
ag. Healthcare agent ha uses this information to strengthen its
calculation about ag’s trustworthiness AT tha,ag by substituting
this information in Eq. 6.
AT tha,ag = µPT
t
ha,NH,ag + δRP
t
ha,HR,ag,
where µ+ δ = 1
(6)
Here µ and δ are weighting factors that are set by ha to
express the weight it puts on trustworthiness values received
from neighboring agents and reputation scores provided
by reputation centres. In the following, we show how the
calculation is performed for the terms that are expressed in
Eq. 6.
a) Propagated trustworthiness: Healthcare agent ha
communicates its request about the trustworthiness of agent
ag along with its confidence criteria and time scope T to its
neighboring agents NH. Agents NH reply to this request by
either providing their recorded experiences with ag or just their
trustworthiness estimate that satisfies ha’s confidence criteria.
There are three approaches to accommodate NH’s feedback
and the selection process depends on ha’s request’s context.
Combined approach: If we assume that each agent
x ∈ NH has a common behaviour, tells the truth, and uses
the same evaluation measure as ha, then we add the received
experiences from x to ha’s self-experiences about ag [6].
Thus, the value of parameters α and β in Eq. 4 will be updated
to reflect this change as in Eq. 7.
αc =
∑
x∈NH∪{ha}
gTx,ag + 1
βc =
∑
x∈NH∪{ha}
bTx,ag + 1
(7)
As a result, the propagated trustworthiness about ag is cal-
culated as the expected value of the beta distribution as in
Eq. 8.
PT tha,NH,ag =
αc
αc + βc
(8)
Discounting approach: If our assumptions in the com-
bined approach are invalid, then we need to use an alterna-
tive way to give higher weight to feedback received from
highly trusted healthcare agents from ha’s perspective. In
this approach, we adopt Jøsang et al.’s [6] reputation dis-
counting method that discounts the feedback as a function
of the reputation of the healthcare agent who provided it.
Therefore, the feedback received from agent x will be adjusted
according to ha’s previous experiences with x during time T
as demonstrated in Eq. 9.
DgTha,x,ag =
2gTha,xg
T
x,ag
(bTha,x + 2)(gTx,ag + bTx,ag + 2) + 2g
T
ha,x
DbTha,x,ag =
2gTha,xb
T
x,ag
(bTha,x + 2)(gTx,ag + bTx,ag + 2) + 2g
T
ha,x
(9)
As a consequence, the values of parameters α and β will
change proportionately as expressed in Eq. 10. Thereafter, the
propagated trustworthiness is measured as illustrated in Eq. 8.
αd =gTha,ag +
∑
x∈NH
DgTha,x,ag + 1
βd =bTha,ag +
∑
x∈NH
DbTha,x,ag + 1
(10)
Bayesian approach: The discounting approach mandates
the need to communicate the anticipated experiences between
neighboring healthcare agents NH and ha, which would, for
example, reveal some information about agent x’s interactions
with agent ag which may be considered from x’s point of
view as private information, and thus x may be reluctant to
provide this information to ha. To overcome this problem, we
use Mui et al.’s [9] Bayesian reputation inference approach
where only a trustworthiness estimate is passed between x and
ha, which satisfies x’s privacy requirements. The propagated
trustworthiness in ag as measured by ha through agent x is
calculated according to Eq. 11.
PAT tha,x,ag = AT
t
ha,xAT
t
x,ag+(1−AT tha,x)(1−AT tx,ag) (11)
We sum the propagated trustworthiness of each x ∈ NH
and normalise it, and then use it to produce ha’s propagated
trustworthiness in ag as in Eq. 12.
PT tha,NH,ag =
1
2
(
AT tha,ag +
∑
x∈NH PAT
t
ha,x,ag
|NH|
)
(12)
b) Reputation Rating: Healthcare agent ha communi-
cates its reputation rating request about agent ag to healthcare
reputation centres HR. Each reputation centre replies with
a value for each rating scale that has been captured during
period T , in other words the number of times that ag is rated
in each scale. We assume that each y ∈ HR use the same
scale for ratings. Here, we denote the rating scale as a vector
~r = (r1, r2, . . . , rk); for example, we can use the following
rating scale with 5 levels for the healthcare reputation centres,
~r = (bad,mediocre, average, good, excellent). Once centre
y has received a reputation rating request about ag, it will
reply by sending a vector ~RTy,ag that contains the associated
number for each rating level that has been captured during
time period T . Let the rating level be indexed by i and have
k levels. Then the aggregate ratings for a particular agent ag
are expressed as:
~RTy,ag = (R
T
y,ag(i)|i = 1 . . . k). (13)
In order to calculate the reputation rating score for agent ag,
we use Jøsang et al.’s [7] multinomial probability approach
where the reputation score is defined as a function of the
probability expectation values of each element in ~r at time t.
The expectation value for each rating level can be computed
with Eq. 14. Let ~R represent ag’s aggregated ratings. Then
vector ~S, defined by,
~Sty,ag
def=
(
Sty,ag(i) =
RTy,ag(i) + Ca(i)
C +
∑k
j=1R
T
y,ag(j)
∣∣∣∣∣i = 1 . . . k
)
,
where C = 2 and a(i) = 1k
(14)
is the corresponding multinomial probability reputation score.
However, this result does not represent the reputation rating
score as a singleton value, so we follow a compacting approach
where we assign a weighting factor v(i) to each rating
element i as shown in Eq. 15, and, afterwards, we compute
the reputation score for ag by multiplying these weights with
their corresponding element in ~Sty,ag and normalise the result
as shown in Eq. 16.
v(i) =
2i− 2
k − 1 − 1, where v(i) ∈ [−1, 1] (15)
RP tha,y,ag =
1
2
 k∑
j=1
v(j)Sty,ag(j)
+ 1
2
(16)
The aforementioned approach shows how a reputation score
can be calculated from one healthcare reputation centre y,
however, healthcare agent ha might receive feedback from
more than one reputation centre and the more feedback we get
the more accurate the reputation score we can estimate. There
are two approaches to follow in manipulating this feedback
and they depend on the reputation centre’s behaviour from
ha’s perspective.
Combined approach: If each y ∈ HR uses a controlled
context in getting the patients’ feedback, tells the truth, and
uses the same rating framework, then we can combine HR’s
feedback to represent one vector as in Eq. 17.
~CR
T
HR,ag
def=
(
CRTHR,ag(i) =
∑
y∈HR
RTy,ag(i)
∣∣∣∣∣i = 1 . . . k
)
.
(17)
Subsequently, this vector will be used in Eq. 14 and Eq. 16
to compute the reputation score.
Bayesian approach: It is difficult to assure that health-
care reputation centres HR behave equally due to the fact that
each centre has its own reputation context that would differ
from others. Also, the trustworthiness that ha will have in
reputation centre y will vary. In this case, we employ the
trustworthiness that ha has in y to relax the reputation score
calculated from y’s feedback. The trustworthiness is calculated
in the same way that we introduced in Section III-A. As a
result, we can express the reputation score as in Eq. 18.
RP tha,NH,ag =
1
2
∑
y∈RH
AT tha,y
k∑
j=1
v(j)Sty,ag(j)
+ 1
2
(18)
B. Medical Misconduct Practice Evaluation
In the TMDT model, we assume that the healthcare au-
thority creates and maintains a medical misconduct record
for each agent ag (a healthcare organisation or a medical
practitioner). In order to create and maintain this record,
the healthcare authority records malpractice medical cases
received from healthcare agents against other agents ag and,
afterwards, uses certain classification rules to update the ag’s
medical misconduct history. We assume that this history is
classified in terms of severity and can be presented as a vector
~m = (m1,m2, . . . ,mn), where m1 denotes the lowest severity
and mn denotes the highest. In this case, each ag has its
own medical misconduct record denoted as vector ~M , and
is expressed as in Eq. 19.
~Mag
def= (Mag(i)|i = 1 . . . n) (19)
In order to estimate ag’s medical misconduct rate, the
healthcare authority uses a credit deduction process. In this
process, each agent ag initially has Z points of credit and
this credit is reduced according to ag’s reported medical
misconduct cases. This deduction process employs a weighting
vector ~w that is set by the healthcare authority to determine the
credit loss given to each element in ~m. Agent ag’s (healthcare
organisation or medical practitioner) credit is computed as in
Eq. 20.
ACag = 1−
∑n
i=1 w(i)Mag(i)
Z
(20)
Now, we can estimate ag’s medical misconduct rate as in
Eq. 21.
MRag =
{
ACag, where ACag ≥ 0;
0, where ACag < 0.
(21)
Thereafter, this value is communicated to ha which substitutes
it with the computed trustworthiness values in Eq. 1 to produce
the trustworthiness score of the medical data field mdf .
IV. CASE SCENARIO
We use the following case scenario to demonstrate the func-
tionality of the TMDT assessment model and discuss how the
chosen time period per can influence our final trustworthiness
result. Let’s assume that Hospital A’s EHR system accesses
in 2009 a blood pressure reading b that was created in 2004.
The medical reading was entered by Intern K at Hospital J .
The EHR system maintains a database where it records its
observed experiences with K and J in a time-ordered basis
(TABLE II). For the sake of simplicity, we assume that neither
K nor J has committed a medical malpractice case, thus
MRJ = MRK = 1. Let’s assume further that the EHR system
sets the confidence criteria n = 4 and its subjective weights of
the impact of the medical practitioner and healthcare organi-
sation on the medical data’s trustworthiness to be ξK = 0.6
and ξJ = 0.4.
In order to apply Eq. 1, we need to evaluate the trust-
worthiness of K and J . To carry out that process we need
to define the time scope T . Let’s assume that per = 1,
which means one year, so the time scope is defined as
T = [2003, 2005]. Now, we count Hospital A’s good and bad
experiences that were recorded during T with both K and J ,
which leads to the following two binary tuples ETA,K = (7, 10)
and ETA,J = (8, 7). From these tuples, we notice that the
number of A’s experiences with either K or J is greater
than n. Therefore, we follow the internal assessment approach.
Eq. 5 is then used to compute the trustworthiness of K and
J to produce trustworthiness measures AT tA,K = 0.42 and
AT tA,J = 0.52. These two values thereafter are substituted
in Eq. 1 to provide the trustworthiness value of the accessed
medical data b which is T tA,b = 0.46.
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Fig. 3. Beta function of the expected behaviour of the agent
Now let’s set the time period per to be 2 years, and follow
the aforementioned approach to compute the trustworthiness
of blood pressure reading b. We find that the trustworthiness
of b gets increased and is equal to 0.51. Let’s further change
the time period and make per equal 3 years. By following
the same approach, we find that Hospital A’s trust in b has
changed and is now equal to 0.5 which is lower than the
second computed value.
Thus, changing the time period affects the final trustwor-
thiness value as it impacts the trustworthiness calculation of
the agent. Fig. 3 shows how each chosen period has affected
the behaviour of the beta function that is drawn by using
the computed α and β values for Hospital J (Fig. 3(a)) and
Intern K (Fig. 3(b)) which consequently produced a different
trustworthiness value for each time period.
Determining the appropriate size of time period is difficult.
For instance, if an agent X’s trustworthiness is largely stable
over time then in order to evaluate his trustworthiness at a cer-
tain time in the past the size of the time period would not make
a big difference. However, if the agent X’s trustworthiness is
unstable and keeps changing, the time period’s size will have
a high impact on our trustworthiness calculation. Therefore,
the appropriate approach to define the time period is to derive
it from the agent’s recent behaviour.
V. IMPLEMENTATION
To demonstrate the functionality of our model, we have
developed a Java application that simulates the relevant part
of the functionality of the Electronic Health Record system.
Inside the application, we have implemented a trustworthiness
service (TS) which implements the TMDT assessment model.
Also, we have configured a MySQL database server which the
TS uses to get the agent’s data required in the trustworthiness
calculation process. Each agent’s database is represented as
a database table in our MySQL server. Also, we built a
user interface panel which we use to load the incoming
medical data and its metadata and to indicate which external
assessment approach the TS will use in cases where the agent’s
internal experiences fail to satisfy the confidence criteria.
To run our application we set the confidence criteria n and
time period per that the TS will use in its trustworthiness
evaluation. Upon receiving incoming medical data, which we
simulate by entering manually, an evaluation request is sent
to the TS which uses the metadata and gets the required
internal and, if necessary, external data for trustworthiness
calculation process as presented in Section III. Once the TS
has finished the calculation, the trustworthiness value is passed
to the application which uses the resulting value to change the
RGB value of the medical data field’s background color to the
appropriate red hue to reflect the trustworthiness of the medical
data (e.g. dark red indicates untrustworthy data).
VI. CONCLUSION
An Electronic Health Record (EHR) system overcomes
the problems and limitations that are associated with paper
based and isolated Electronic Medical Record (EMR) systems;
however, its adoption is hindered by concerns over privacy
and reliability (trust). Medical data trustworthiness is a vital
requirement which has a high impact on how medical data
TABLE II
HOSPITAL A’S OBSERVED EXPERIENCES OF HOSPITAL J AND INTERN K
Time J’s observed experiences K’s observed experiencesGood Bad Good Bad
1999 1 3 2 1
2000 2 1 1 1
2001 4 0 1 5
2002 3 4 5 1
2003 3 1 1 4
2004 3 1 4 1
2005 2 5 2 5
2006 1 5 2 4
2007 5 1 2 4
2008 1 1 2 1
2009 2 0 3 1
will be utilised. In the current situation, all medical data are
usually assumed trustworthy a priori so, in the absence of
a trustworthiness evaluation, all data will be valued equally;
however, this should not be the case.
In this paper, we presented a time-variant medical data trust-
worthiness model that follows a mathematical statistical ap-
proach to conduct trustworthiness evaluations. Our model uses
the metadata attached to incoming medical data, namely the
healthcare organisation’s identity, medical practitioner’s iden-
tity, and the event timestamp. The trustworthiness evaluation is
then conducted by considering the encountered source agent’s
trustworthiness prior to and after the time at which the medical
data was recorded, in order to produce an accurate estimate,
rather than relying on the agent’s perceived trustworthiness
at the current time. Thereafter, the resulting trustworthiness
value can be communicated to the EHR displayed on a medical
practitioner’s computer to alert the medical practitioner to any
reliability problems.
In future work we will carry out an investigation to define
the time period as a function of the agent’s trustworthiness
behaviour. Also, we plan to demonstrate this model by im-
plementing it in a healthcare workflow system. We plan to
implement TMDT as a service within the YAWL4 system
where it will respond to each reliability assessment request
that comes from any healthcare workflow process. Finally, we
plan to utilise the metadata attributes that are employed by
YAWL to reflect the calculated reliability score of a given
medical data.
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